Continuity and change in Danish active labour market policy: 1990-2007.
The battlefield between activation and workfare

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Abstract

Active Danish labour market policies (ALMP) have variably been described as neoliberal workfare or as Social Democratic activation. Analysing changes 1990-2007, we suggest that it should rather be conceived of as a battlefield between these extremes, dictated by interests, by policy learning, and by the economic situation. Overall, ALMP has moved towards the "workfare" pole, but key Liberal ministers have actively endorsed the idea of "flexicurity". With a few exceptions, policies have moved towards stricter conditionality rather than genuine retrenchment. By 2006, negative evaluations of incentive-based measures indicate that this pathway of change is largely exhausted. The Danish case illustrates that economic prosperity can be more conducive to change than economic austerity, as the availability of jobs makes it easier to legitimise tough measures. Low unemployment also killed experiments with new leave arrangements, led governments to prioritise work more than education, and to a shift of attention towards those who receive social assistance.
Introduction: Active labour market policy and welfare state change

Active labour market policy (ALMP) in Denmark was introduced on a full scale by the new Social Democratic coalition government in 1993. Even though it contained elements of continuity, ALMP nevertheless represented a break with the strong emphasis on social rights in the social security philosophy of the 1970's and 1980's. Throughout the 1990's, the new ALMP was adjusted and changed, in what was afterwards referred to as a labour market reform in three stages (1993, 1995 and 1998). The fourth stage has been carried through under the Liberal-Conservative government that came into office in 2001. It consists of a labour market reform in 2002, two reforms on immigration and integration in 2002 and 2005, and a welfare reform in 2006. The fourth stage is largely in continuation of previous reforms but represents a somewhat increased emphasis on incentives and an extension to immigration policy. However, it could also seem to represent an exhaustion of the policy path since 1993.

There is considerable disagreement about the interpretation of the development in Danish labour market policies. At one extreme, Danish ALMP is seen largely as workfare, that is, as a disciplinary device of work for welfare that erodes the social rights of those unemployed (Christensen, 2000; Lødemel & Trickey, 2001; Loftager, 2002; Kildal, 2001; Handler, 2004). At the other pole, scholars have emphasized re-qualification and continuity; activation has even been pictured as representing a new paradigm of empowerment as individual action plans (from 2003 labelled job plans) had to be decided by the unemployed and the job officer (Born & Jensen, 2002). Still others have distinguished between a Liberal and a Social Democratic model of activation and place the Danish system in the latter category (Barbier, 2005), while at the same time pointing out that formal rules should not be taken too literally. What matters is how they are implemented (Barbier, 2005). In the Danish system with corporatist regional boards guiding the activation effort, and with unemployment benefits being administered by union-controlled unemployment insurance funds, there was little risk that the interests of the unemployed would be completely disregarded. Finally, some scholars point at general changes in social policies towards an “active citizenship” orientation where the individual is granted more influence but is also required to assume more responsibility (Jensen & Pfau-Effinger, 2005). All these interpretations contain elements of truths. To reach a more precise and balanced account, however, it seem preferable to conceive of empowerment vs. workfare as a continuum or as a battle-
field, rather than as a dichotomy. Most policies are ambivalent and can be moved in one direction or the other. Danish ALMP contains some elements of workfare but also elements of solid social protection, qualification, or even empowerment. But the balance between these elements is variable. It is likely to depend on policy learning, on the influence of political actors (with different interests and different power resources), and on the employment situation.

The following account of the development of Danish ALMP is based on a distinction between changes at three levels (Goul Andersen, 2007): (1) changes in underlying paradigms and elite discourse; (2) changes in institutions and policies; (3) changes in outcomes. As far as discourse is concerned, we shall describe the change from a “social security paradigm” towards a “structural unemployment” paradigm. As to institutions, we shall focus both on changes in the administration of the system and on changing rules and principles of policy. Finally, we shall try to assess changes in outcomes on the basis of studies of implementation and on the basis of the balance between UB and social assistance.

When it comes to outcomes, however, it is necessary to consider the macroeconomic surroundings. ALMP inevitably takes on another shape in a surrounding of mass unemployment like in the early 1990s, and in a surrounding of prosperity and shortage of labour power as in the mid 2000s. Indeed, similar institutions and policies can produce highly different outcomes in different settings, including erosion of social rights known as “drift” (Hacker, 2004). In the Danish instance, it is the opposite situation, however: Due to improved employment, institutional changes have less dramatic impact on outcomes. In this paper, we shall follow how policy focus gradually changed and served to:

- phase out the elements of a radical decommodification/citizens’ wage path that was pursued along with ALMP in the first years after 1993
- shift emphasis from education to more direct routes to work
- shift priorities from people receiving unemployment benefits to the labour force reserves among social assistance claimants and others
- include integration policy as part of labour market policy as ethnic minorities constitute a large majority among families receiving social assistance

Even though changes in government did not always coincide with changes in policy, we follow a chronological structure in the following, describing policy changes under three different governments: Centre-right 1982-1993; Centre-left 1993-2001 and centre-right after 2001.
The paradigm shift in the interpretation of unemployment 1988-1992

The new active line in Danish labour market policy was introduced in 1993 after some years of (apparently successful) experiments with new requirements to young social assistance claimants (Albrekt Larsen & Goul Andersen, 2003b). Until then, the Danish unemployment benefit system was approaching a de facto “citizen wage” system (Goul Andersen, 1996). Easy access\(^1\), almost unlimited duration (eight years including two periods of job offer, but re-qualification after 26 weeks of work), 90 per cent compensation rate for all people eligible to benefits (but with a rather low ceiling), and a lenient works test. This policy embodied the ultimate “social rights” conception of citizenship which was reflected in the Social Democratic party programme of 1977: It stated that unemployment was an event outside the control of the individual, and that unemployed benefits should, accordingly, be guaranteed for an unlimited period.

However, the Danish economic situation deteriorated dramatically in 1979-1982 (Goul Andersen, 1997) - often pictured as a movement towards “the edge of the abyss”.\(^2\) This paved the way for a crisis consciousness, for new policy strategies - and for a new government as the centre parties withdrew their support for the Social Democrats. The raison d’être of the Conservative-Liberal government 1982-1993 was "economic reconstruction" - via anti-inflationary policies giving first priority to competitiveness. The main elements (reluctantly accepted even by the Social Democrats) were liberalization of capital markets, a fixed currency policy, suspension (from 1987 abolition) of automatic indexation of wages, narrow budget constraints for the public sector, and a temporary freezing of maximum unemployment benefits (1982-85, but partly compensated by a 10 per cent increase in 1988).

However, after this initial freezing and a few - largely unsuccessful - attempts to change the unemployment benefit system, the Bourgeois government left this system almost intact.\(^3\) From a citizenship perspective, the system worked surprisingly well: Denmark had a world record in avoiding poverty, social marginalisation or loss of well-being among unemployed people (Goul Andersen, 1996, 2002, 2003; Hauser & Nolan, 2000: 38;

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\(^1\) Full rights only presupposed one year's membership of an unemployment insurance fund and 26 weeks of employment within the last three years

\(^2\) By 1982, unemployment had increased to nearly 10 per cent, inflation was 10 per cent, long-term interest rates were above 20 per cent, the balance of payment deficit was 4.1 per cent of GDP (foreign debts reaching 34.5 per cent of GDP), and state deficit had increased to 11.5 pct. of GDP.

\(^3\) In 1985 the government decided to abolish the second job offer in favour of education or support to establish own business. Otherwise UB was reduced to 70 per cent after 5½ years of unemployment. However, in a Budget compromise with the Social Democrats in 1987, this decision was revoked. Thus, the major change was a slight increase in member contributions to unemployment insurance.
Gallie et al., 2000: 50-51; Whelan & McGinnity 2000: 292). However, critics spoke about insufficient incentives and unemployment traps (Social Commision, 1993), and they were supported by new perspectives on unemployment.

Until 1988, unemployment had been conceived by all actors as an effect of insufficient demand. Before 1982, the Social Democrats have applied any thinkable Keynesian instrument to fight unemployment (Goul Andersen, 2002): Deficit financing, longer holidays, early retirement, switch from private to public consumption (as the import rate is lower in the latter). But nothing seemed to work. The Bourgeois government gave higher priority to competitiveness and export-driven increase in demand for labour power, but they did not envisage any structural constraints. By 1989, however, the government introduced new theories of structural unemployment into the Danish policy debates (Government, 1989). Structural unemployment is defined as the "Non-Accelerating Wage Rate of Unemployment" (NAWRU), that is, the lowest rate of unemployment compatible with stable wage increases. Even though the concept was applied somewhat more ambiguously among decision-makers, the notion of structural unemployment implied a switch of focus to the (labour) supply side: Mismatch between minimum wages and qualifications, insufficient work incentives, and inflexible labour markets meant that it would be impossible to lower unemployment substantially without structural reforms. Structural ("natural") unemployment had increased to 8-10 per cent; to reduce unemployment below that level would require lower minimum wages and lower benefits in order to strengthen financial incentives to work. In addition to this, there were problems with geographical mobility and mobility across trades. Under these conditions, it was claimed, even export-driven higher demand for labour power would not lead to lower unemployment, but to higher inflation as employers would begin competing for those already employed (Goul Andersen, 2002).

This diagnosis first appeared in the spring report from the Economic Council (1988) and the next year in the Government’s “White Paper about the structural problems at the labour market” (1989). The diagnosis was largely confirmed in the report (1992) of a (corporatist) “Commission of the Structural Problems on the Labour Market”, and it soon became the dominant perspective on unemployment among policy experts, organisations, and political parties - not least because it could explain why the economic upswing had
come to an end in 1987, due to high inflation. Later, in the OECD (1994) Jobs Study, it became the new orthodoxy.

In Denmark, however, this paradigm shift took place as a silent revolution with little immediate impact beyond the discursive level. No major new reforms were adopted (an attempt was made in 1989), and no fierce ideological struggles over the issue took place – unlike what is described in Hall’s (1993) theory of paradigmatic change. Only policy experts noticed the change. Because the government was by and large unwilling to take action against unemployment (since it was regarded as structural), it was unable to find a majority in Parliament for any major change (Asmussen, 2007).

It is an important point that even though a paradigm shift acts as a constraint to policy, it does not dictate one single solution. This probably explain why it was so readily accepted by other actors: Employers could argue that minimum wages and, accordingly, benefits, should be lowered to enable wages to match qualifications; trade unions could argue that qualifications should be raised to match minimum wages, and still others (in particular the Ministry of Industry) argued in favour of subsidizing low-productive services for private households.

It was mainly the second (and to a lesser extent the third) path that was to be pursued in Danish policy in the 1990’s. And instead of genuine retrenchment that could improve incentives, the Social Democratic governments resorted to shorter duration, and to stricter conditions of eligibility and rules of availability, in short what Clasen (2005: 16) has labelled stricter criteria of conditionality.

A major difference between the new Social Democratic coalition government in 1993 and the old Conservative-Liberal government (1982-1993) was that the new government was politically able to act on the basis of the new paradigm - but by means of other policy solutions, and mixed with Keynesian demand-stimulating policies (Asmussen, 2007). According to the key architect of the new government’s economic policies, Minister of Finance Mogens Lykketoft (himself a brilliant economist), his ministry received him in 1993 with the message that it was almost in vain to fight unemployment, since it was structural. But he allegedly responded that if there was such a thing as structural unemployment, the Ministry should do anything to lower it.  

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4 Actually, the high wage increases in 1987 were released in collective negotiations rather than via wage drift. It is plausible that the cause of these wage increases was political and not economic: 1987 was election year, and the government had to improve its popularity among public employees by means of wage increases; this had an effect also on negotiations in the private sector.

5 Personal communication, 29. Sep. 2006.
Two paths in the 1990's

However, the "citizen wage path" was not phased out overnight. On the contrary, the government was keen to lower unemployment before the next election in 1994, and in 1993-94, it maintained and expanded a number of these arrangements while at the same time introducing its new activation policies. Labour market and economic policies in the mid-1990s followed two contradictory paths: A citizen's income path, and an activation path. Further, there remained for quite a while an ambivalence in the activation path between strengthening the rights and the duties of the unemployed.

The Citizens' Income Path

The citizens' income path actually seemed to be expanded by new elements in the 1993 labour market reform: A pre-pre-retirement "transitional allowance" for long-term unemployed (introduced for 55-59 year olds in 1992) was extended to the 50-54 years old. Parental and educational leave (also introduced on a smaller scale in 1992) were significantly improved. Parental leave (in addition to 28 weeks of maternity leave) was extended from 36 to a maximum of 52 weeks of which the first 13 weeks became a right for all parents with 0-8 years old children (the remaining weeks were dependent on written agreement with the employer). The allowance was originally 80 per cent of maximum unemployment benefits; but most municipalities provided additional support. Educational leave required acceptance by the employer, but allowance was 100 per cent of maximum unemployment benefits. Both arrangements were also open to unemployed[6] who typically constituted about one-half of the persons on leave until 1999. Finally, a sabbatical leave was introduced on the same economic conditions as parental leave but conditional on job rotation. (Goul Andersen et al, 2003).

The government took pride in its new leave policies, enabling a changing relationship between family and working life (Nyrup Rasmussen, 1995). However, these policies had not yet become irreversible, and parental leave gave bottleneck problems from the very first day as nurses and other groups who had never been unemployed did not want to miss this single opportunity in a lifetime to have a break. Already in the December 1994 "check up" of the labour market reform, sabbatical leave was decided to be terminated for new applicants from 1996. Parental leave and educational leave were made permanent, but

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[6] This was explicitly argued as a matter of citizenship – e.g. by Prime minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen in his parliamentary opening speech in 1995.
compensation for parental leave was gradually lowered from 80 to 60 per cent. This reduced take up substantially. In the period from 1995 to 1997 the number of recipients on parental leave and sabbatical leave was reduced by more than one-half (Rostgaard et al., 2000; Ministry of Finance, 1997).

In the government's 1995 Budget agreement with the Conservatives (phase 2 of the labour market reform), transitional allowance was agreed to be terminated from 1996 (and phased out over ten years). As part of the 1999 Budget agreement in 1998, educational leave for unemployed was restricted to nine weeks, and from 2000 it was abolished. As part of the 2000 Budget agreement, educational leave was finally terminated altogether from 2001. Parental leave was phased out from 2002 along with the introduction of a new one-year maternity leave scheme.

In short, by 2000-2001, the citizens’ wage path was completely closed. This must be seen against the background of a dramatically improved employment situation where nearly 25 years of mass unemployment had unexpectedly come to an end (see figure 1). In this situation the new measures could be adopted virtually without any resistance, It is a good illustration that high economic growth can often be even more conducive to welfare state retrenchment than austerity. In fact, the economic upswing was a driving force behind nearly all reforms in this field since the mid-1990s - reforms which have constituted an almost uninterrupted series of tightening.\textsuperscript{7}

\textsuperscript{7} Not surprisingly, the Ministry of Finance saw the causal order differently in its reports: It was the new measures to fight structural unemployment that had caused the sudden and dramatic decline in unemployment.
Figure 1. Registered unemployment, 1970-2007. Per cent of labour force.

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The Active Line

The active line was rooted in the notion of structural unemployment, in particular in the idea that structural unemployment derives to a large extent from a mismatch between minimum wages and labour productivity, or (to be stressed more after 2001) from incentive problems. From this philosophy, five functionally equivalent policies can be derived: (1) Lower minimum wages; (2) subsidies for low-productive work; (3) activation: improved productivity through education and job training; (4) stronger incentives to work (lower benefits for unemployed or lower taxes for employed); and (5) stronger criteria of conditionality. In order to avoid lower benefits and minimum wages, the unions accepted the other measures. It is the combination of activation, more strict conditions of benefits, and shorter duration of benefits - new rights and new duties - that has characterized the Danish "Active Line". And it is the changed balance between rights and duties that characterize its development since 1994.

Note: Calculated as full-time unemployed. Survey-based standard unemployment rates (SUR) are usually 1-2 per cent lower.


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In addition, everybody could agree that mismatch between demand and supply as regards types of qualifications contributes to structural unemployment and bottlenecks. This was embodied in the close monitoring of potential bottlenecks by regional labour market boards.
The reforms of the 1990s have retrospectively been described as a reform in three stages: The 1993 Labour Market Reform (including a "check up" in the 1994 agreement over the 1995 Budget); the 1995 amendment which was part of 1996 Budget agreement, and the 1998 compromise over the 1999 Budget. As to the balance between rights and duties, the first stage of the reform was ambivalent. In the 1993 reform, maximum unemployment period was fixed to seven years; the 1994 amendment introduced "right and duty" to activation during the last three years. But re-qualification required (and still requires) only 26 weeks of ordinary employment.

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9 Although the new policies have been described as a change from a “passive line” to an “active line”, active labour market policy as such was not an entirely new phenomenon. Denmark has a long tradition of active labour market policies, but it was rooted in different philosophies and far less goal-directed to bring people back to employment. Already by 1977, municipalities and counties were required (in a Law about youth unemployment) to establish employment projects, education and courses etc. for the young unemployed. In 1978, a job training programme was adopted, so that people in danger of dropping out of the unemployment benefit system were offered an “appropriate” job. In the mid-1980s, this was supplemented by subsidizing education or the establishment of a private firm. In short, the old system was not characterized solely by “passive support”. By 1992, 13.9 bill. DkK (about 1½ pct. of GDP) was spent on active labour market policies (including rehabilitation), and calculated as "full-year persons", 116.200 persons participated in activation broadly defined (Commission on structural labour market problems, 1992). According to OECD definitions and calculations, spending on active labour market policies went up from 1.1 per cent of GDP in 1986 and 1990 to 1.8 per cent in 1994 and 1997. By comparison, the unweighted EU average was 0.9 per cent af GDP in 1985 and 1990, and 1.2 and 1.1 per cent in 1994 and 1997, respectively (Martin, 2000 p 85).
Figure 2. An Overview of Labour Market Policy in Denmark in the 1990s: Two Paths.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>&quot;Path of activation&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;Citizen's wage path&quot;</th>
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<tr>
<td>1993 Labour Market reform I (implemented from 1994)</td>
<td>- Duration unempl.benefits 7 years (plus leave), not possible to regain entitlement through activation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Duration unempl.benefits 7 years (plus leave), not possible to regain entitlement through activation</td>
<td>- Transnational and sabbatical leave reduced to 70 (later 60) per cent. of maximum UB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Decentralised corporatist labour market policy</td>
<td>- Parental leave and sabbatical leave reduced to 70 (later 60) per cent. of maximum UB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Individual plans of action for long-term unemployed</td>
<td>- Sabbatical leave to be phased out in 1999.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Right and duty to activation after four years, last three years on permanent activation</td>
<td>- Right and duty to activation after four years, last three years on permanent activation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Stronger availability requirements and sanctions</td>
<td>- Parental leave and sabbatical leave reduced to 70 (later 60) per cent. of maximum UB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Unlimited right to UB for 50-59 years old</td>
<td>- Sabbatical leave to be phased out in 1999.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Reform Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Labour Market Reform II (implemented from 1996; Compromise over 1996 Budget with Conservatives)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Labour Market Reform II</td>
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<td>1998</td>
<td>Labour Market Reform III (implemented from 1999; Compromise over 1999 Budget)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Labour Market Reform III:</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>(1998 Law on social assistance replaced by new law complex, including &quot;Law on active social policy&quot;, stressing duty to activation for everybody and duty to accept any “appropriate” job).</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Duty to seek job actively for social assistance claimants who “only have employment as problem”</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Educational leave abolished for unemployed (but right to 6 weeks of education)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Educational leave programme closed</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Parental leave replaced by improved maternity leave</td>
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<td>2002</td>
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Active labour market policy was decentralized to 14 regions with corporatist boards directing policy implementation according to specific regional needs. Finally, for all long-term unemployed, an "individual plan of action" should be elaborated in a dialogue between the unemployed and the employment office, describing how activation could be designed in accordance with the wishes and the abilities of the unemployed as well as the need of regional labour markets in order to maximize employment chances (Jensen, 1999). In principle, this constitutes a strengthening of rights, even though practices have not always followed the ideals (Olesen, 1999; Larsen and Stamhus, 2000).

The “individual plans of action” have largely been maintained, but under a new label “job plan” from 2003. However, successive reforms have given ever more emphasis
to duties. A forerunner which strongly inspired later developments was a "youth allowance" in 1990 for 18-19 years old. It demanded early activation as a condition for receiving social assistance. By 1992, this was extended to the entire age group below 25 years (in the 1998 "Law on active social policies" which replaced the law on social assistance, this was further extended to the 25-29 years old social assistance recipients).

From 1995, the three years of “active period” came to include the "right and duty" to permanent activation. In the second phase of the reform, duration of benefits was cut to five years, with "right and duty" to activation after two years, and entitlements to benefits now required 52 weeks of ordinary employment. Various other requirements regarding transport time and duty to take jobs outside one's trade were tightened. Finally, in 1998 duration was fixed to four years, with (a very costly, it turned out) duty to activation after only one year, at least for 75 per cent of the time (in education or job training). In practice, however, the degree of activation declined to 26 per cent in 2000 and 17 per cent in 2004 (Ministry of Labour, 2005b: 11). The 50-54 years old who had until then enjoyed benefits infinitely, were now transferred to ordinary conditions, whereas special arrangements for the 55-59 year olds were maintained until 2006.

Further, the 1998 agreement included a reform of the early retirement allowance giving people a strong economic incentive to postpone retirement till the age of 62 (60-61 years old receive only 91 per cent of the allowance and have an imputed rent from private pensions savings deducted from the allowance). Also in 1998, the Law on Social Assistance was replaced by a new law complex including a "Law on Active Social Policy". Both the title and in particular the wording of the paragraphs underline the duty to work.\(^\text{10}\) Finally, a reform of Disability Pension, also emphasizing the work line alongside with some improvements of benefits, was adopted in 2000.

Concomitantly, at the level of discourse, we find an increasing emphasis on incentives rather than qualifications. Evaluations indicated very limited effects of activation as well as a substantially reduced job seeking during activation. From around 2000, the Ministry of Labour (2000) and the Ministry of Finance (2001: 93-97) increasingly came to see activation as a chilling instrument, as it had been observed that unemployed often managed to find a job shortly before compulsory activation. Further on, the Ministry conducted comprehensive studies of incentive structures (Ministry of Finance, 2002, 2004).

\(^{10}\) For details about the rules for social assistance claimants, see Albrekt Larsen & Goul Andersen (2003b: 87-91); for details about deductions for private pensions, see Goul Andersen (2007b).
At the formal level, the Danish rules for the unemployed have become among the tightest in Europe, in particular regarding requirements to take any “appropriate” job. Already by 1999, the Government's benchmarking of duty to work placed the Danish system nearly on line with Sweden where the duty to work has always been a core element in social and labour market policy (Ministry of Finance, 1999: 183-87; Government 1999: 290-91; Goul Andersen 1996: 161). However, not very much is known about actual practices. Stricter requirement undoubtedly served as signals and endow job officers with more authority, but the low level of protests from the trade unions and from the union-controlled unemployment insurance funds indicates that outcome may have changed less than formal rules could let one believe. As a more tangible measure, it is remarkable that the relative proportions of unemployment benefits and social assistance recipients among those who are registered as unemployed has remained constant over the last 15 years (Bendix Jensen, 2003) - with the former group constituting some 80 per cent of all registered unemployed and even more after 2000.\footnote{See Statistics Denmark, Statistiske Efterretninger: Arbejdsmarked (various issues). These figures do not include those social assistance claimants who are not considered available for the labour market.} On balance, unemployment benefits remained generous in terms of duration and high minima, and even though there was ever stronger emphasis on the duty to work, it would be misleading to think that the dramatic formal requirements were applied that often. In this period policy seems to have served more as signals and symbols than as processes that has resulted in changes in policy outcome.

Still, the ALMP of the 1990s represented a significant break with the past for Social Democrats who had always fiercely criticized any initiative in that direction when the party was in opposition. There are multiple explanations. A new orthodoxy of economic ideas seemingly had helped the Social Democrats change preferences - probably catalysed by similar policy changes elsewhere as the tightening of rules in Denmark was by no means exceptional (Kalish et al, 1998; Goul Andersen et al., 2002). Further, the party was influenced by communitarian ideas of social integration (not least the Minister of Social Affairs, Karen Jespersen – who later became a member of the Liberal party and in 2007 Minister of Social Affairs in the Liberal-Conservative government). To some extent, the party was also forced to accept tightening as this was a routine requirement from the party’s coalition partner: The Radical Liberals, and accepting a stronger discipline served to avoid what could be worse. In addition, concessions in this field was typically the price to be paid for a compromise with the bourgeois parties over the budget. However, with corporatist control over implementation, there was less reluctance to accept new formal rules...
requirements. In relation to this, it should also be kept in mind that most unemployed have usually welcomed activation (Hansen, 2001; Caswell et al, 2002). In practice, activation typically meant education, and job training was predominantly in the public sector. By January 2000, 35.000 out of 57.000 full-time activated in the activation system of the state were under education; 11.000 were in public job training; 3.000 were receiving guidance, and some 8.000 were under various other programmes. If this could at all be considered “workfare”, it was certainly a “workfare light” version.

Still, the most important factor is probably the changing economic surroundings, with increasing fear of shortage of labour power among decision makers, and with improved opportunities to find a job among those who were squeezed by the new rules. Learning effects reinforced this as it repeatedly appeared that few people lost unemployment benefits due to the shorter duration (ArbejdsMarkedsPolitisk Agenda 15, 2004). The economic situation coupled with learning effects is also an important key to understand the initiatives of the Liberal-Conservative government since 2001.

ALMP under the Liberal-Conservative Government
To a large extent, labour market policies under the Liberal-Conservative government (supported by the Danish People’s Party) since 2001 have been in continuation of the active line in the 1990’s. 4 years duration of unemployment benefits, up to 90 per cent compensation (fixed over the entire period), and re-qualification after 26 weeks have all been maintained. With a few, but significant exceptions for people on social assistance (mainly immigrants), it has been a policy of stricter conditionality rather than cutbacks.

This is in accordance with the overall political strategy of the government: Since the 1920s, there had never been a parliamentary majority to the right without the support of the centre parties, in particular the Radical Liberals. As the Radical Liberals was strongly committed to cooperation with the Social Democrats, the only chance to obtain a majority was to win a substantial number of working-class voters from the Social Democrats, and this required, in turn, moderate welfare policies, combined with more tight policies on immigration (Goul Andersen & Borre, 2003). Accordingly, the Liberal party moved to the left on economic issues and to the right on non-economic or value issues, and this holds even more for the Danish People’s Party which is tough on immigration but has tried to occupy a position as a “classical” Social Democratic party on welfare. This strategy was

successful: Taken together, the parties behind the Liberal-Conservative government attracted more than 50 per cent of the working-class vote in 2001 and 2005, and the Danish People’s Party has for long been the most genuine working-class party in Danish politics (Andersen & Goul Andersen, 2003; Goul Andersen, 2006).

The Danish Liberal-Conservative government has not launched any severe attacks on the UB system¹³; in the 2005 election campaign it even promised not to adopt any major welfare reforms except in a compromise with the Social Democrats, and only to be implemented after the next election. As the possibilities to impose stronger duties, more heavy sanctions and more fierce controls are nearly exhausted, there has been relatively little to do in this field. Further, with low unemployment it was “natural” to put less emphasis on education, and to direct attention to people receiving social assistance, not least to immigrants. Indeed, as it will emerge below, immigration policy has become an integral part of ALMP and vice versa.

For people receiving social assistance, controls were tight already by 2001, but the Liberal-Conservative government made a number of efforts to strengthen incentives, mainly by introducing negative incentives to remain “passive” among those receiving social assistance, and by introducing positive incentives (such as a tax deduction for all employed) to be “active” for all unemployed. Finally, the government has exploited the opportunity to influence implementation and to make institutional changes in the administration of the system.

More People to Work (2002)

The major reform which affected both people on unemployment benefits and social assistance was entitled “More people to work” (see Figure 3). It was adopted in a big compromise between all parties except two minor left wing parties in December 2002 and was put into force from July 2003/January 2004.

The first part was fairly “traditional”: (Even) tougher sanctions, stronger controls, duty to take up appropriate jobs from the first day of unemployment, and duty for young social assistance claimants to start an education or experience sanctions and a reduction of social assistance to about half the ordinary level. Another element was the change in terminology from “individual plans of action” to “job plan” that made even more explicit -

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¹³ The only exception was an attempt in 2003 to introduce a five-week quarantine for better-off unemployed; in the end, however, the government gave up the proposal.
not least to street-level bureaucrats - that the government wished to put more focus on getting the unemployed directly into the labour market.

However, as a new element the 2002 reform also reduced social assistance entitlements in a number of situations in order to ensure that people would always have an incentive to take a job paid at about a minimum wage. Families where both spouses received social assistance had their payment reduced by some 1000 DKK (135 €) after six months; in return the one spouse was allowed to have somewhat higher earnings before this lead to set-off in social assistance of the other. Next, a ceiling on social assistance was imposed for families with extraordinary high expenses who had previously received additional support; this meant a reduction of up to 2580 DKK (about 350 €) per month for some families. Finally, if a wife was considered a homemaker unavailable for the labour market, social assistance was withdrawn and replaced by a housewife supplement. This supplement was finally totally abolished in the welfare reform of 2006. The acceptance of these measures were not unaffected by the fact that immigrants constituted three quarters of the families where both spouses received social assistance (En ny chance for alle, 2005).

Another new element in the 2002 reform was a downplaying of activation which was now supposed to be applied in a more flexible and goal-oriented way throughout the unemployment period. The 75 per cent requirement was replaced by a requirement that after the first year, unemployed had the right and duty to be activated after 6 months of unemployment. Savings from this and other measures were reserved instead for a tax deduction for all those who are in employment (Flere i arbejde, p. 15). This was later implemented in the 2003 tax reform where a (universal) 2½ per cent deduction was introduced for all wage income up to a ceiling.
Figure 3. Labour Market Policy in Denmark since 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unemployment Policy</th>
<th>Immigration/integration Policy</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- more control with administration of duty to work</td>
<td>- strongly reduced “start support” for people who have not stayed in the country for 7 years (including Danish citizens returning from abroad)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- duty to take “appropriate job” from day one for people on UB and SA</td>
<td>X reduction by 15-60 per cent, depending on family type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- tougher sanctions</td>
<td>X from 7919 DKK (\pm 5103) for single person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- duty to take an education for people &lt; 25 years</td>
<td>X from 11400 DKK (\pm 8200) for family with two children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- sanctions + SA reduced to student allowance level for people &lt; 25 y. who fail to do so;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- SA always reduced to student allowance level for people &lt; 25 y. after 9 months</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>- lower social assistance after 6 months for families where both spouses receive SA (about 1000 DKK less per month for about 21.000 persons)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- lower ceiling to social assistance for families with high expenses (reduction up to 2580 DKK per month for about 13.000 families)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>- social assistance replaced by spouse supplement if spouse is not considered available for the labour market</td>
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<tr>
<td>- higher income for one spouse before reduction in social assistance of the other</td>
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<tr>
<td>- more intensive contact and flexible activation throughout the period</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>- right to 6 week education by choice and 6 weeks upon agreement</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>- reduced spending on activation; money reserved for “employment deduction” in income tax</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- harmonization of rules for UB and social assistance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X “appropriate job” from day one</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>X active jobseeking during activation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>X works test linked to “intensive contact”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X harmonization &amp; simplification of sanctions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X stronger control</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2005 checkup</strong></td>
<td><strong>2005 “A new chance for all” - integration agreement</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A checkup was envisaged in the 2002 reform, but it never came to negotiations.</td>
<td>- spouse supplement abolished</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- child benefits for 15-17 years old children contingent on education or job relevant for education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- duty for young social assistance claimants &lt; 25 y to start an education - or they lose SA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- integration contract with a job plan</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>- a minimum requirement of 300 hours work in two years (2006-07: 150 hours in one year) for a family where both spouses receive SA. Otherwise regarded as a homemaker not eligible for SA.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 matching groups; full requirements for 1-4 gr. 1: good match</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>gr. 2: good match, a few qualifications missing</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>gr. 3: partial match: some relevant qualifications</td>
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<td></td>
<td>gr. 4: low match: only very limited job functions are possible</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>gr. 5: no match: no job functions possible (no requirements of job)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- repeated activation for SA recipients even if they have other problems than unemployment</td>
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Finally, the rules for the two categories of unemployed on unemployment benefits and social assistance, respectively, were harmonised, and it was explicitly stated that the system should move towards a one-string system. This was implemented in the 2005 municipal reform which from 2007 reduced the number of municipalities from 270 to 98 and strongly changed the division of labour between the local and the regional level (see below).

New laws on immigration and integration

Because of lower unemployment, attention has turned towards social assistance claimants. This means at the same time that a number of measures are de facto directed primarily against immigrants. Conversely, new policy packages in the field of immigration and integration policy have contained a number of general social policy elements.

The most dramatic one was the 2002 Law on immigration which introduced a new social assistance scheme (start assistance) for immigrants (regardless of citizenship, that is, including even Danish citizens) who have not stayed legally in the country for 7 out of the last 8 years (see Figure 2). As compared to standard social assistance, reductions typically varied from 35 (for a single above the age of 25) to more than 50 per cent, depending on household composition (the largest reductions were for people with children). Whereas the Danish social assistance is about the most generous in the world (providing 60 per cent of maximum unemployment benefits plus additional support), the so-called “start assistance”
and "introduction allowance" (Starthjælp/ introduktionsydelse) is about the least generous social assistance scheme to be found in North-Western Europe (Jensen, 2005).

Officially, the scheme was meant to improve work incentives; however, the main purpose was a chilling effect aimed at reducing immigration. Although the new immigration law was carried through Parliament against the votes of the Social Democrats, the party has largely accepted it – except for the severely reduced entitlements.\textsuperscript{14}

The most remarkable is the 2005 integration package “\textit{a new chance for all}”. Originally, the Social Democrats joined the agreement, but the party withdrew from the negotiations when the agreement was to be implemented in the laws in the autumn of 2005. Apart from a number of measures to improve education and employment opportunities specifically for immigrants, the agreement on the integration package also contained a number of general rules that applied equally to ethnic Danes and ethnic minorities. For instance, young people were denied any social assistance at all if they refused to take an education, and child benefits for the parents of 15-17 years old children were given only if the children were attending an education or having a job relevant to education. Next, it was underlined that social assistance recipients have a duty to repeated activation \textit{even if} they have "other problems than unemployment".

Still, the most remarkable and most controversial part was the requirement that people in households where both spouses receive social assistance were supposed to work for at least 300 hours in a two-year period in order to maintain social assistance, unless they are considered unable to assume any job functions at all. Moreover, as the entire household is formally the recipient of social assistance, the authorities (Arbejdsmarkedsstyrelsen) took the opportunity to extend the rules to all married social assistance recipients. Social assistance recipients are divided into five ‘matching groups’ according to their degree of employability (as judged from qualifications including language skills, health problems, and personal problems such as psychic problems or abuse of drugs or alcohol). The four groups are obliged to work for welfare, by taking an ordinary job from time to time. Otherwise they will lose their social assistance. Matching group 4 which is the most controversial and accounted for 41 per cent of all those who received social assistance by mid-2005 (Arbejdsmarkedspolitisk Agenda no.17, 2005) is described as a low-matching group where "only very limited job functions are possible". It was actually a

\textsuperscript{14} A similar programme had previously been adopted by the Social Democrats in 1998 and implemented in January 1999, but after one year, the benefit was raised to normal social assistance level. (Hansen & Hansen, 2004).
quarrel over this group which made the Social Democrats leave the negotiations about the implementation.

Thus, in 2002 and 2005 we see a turn towards genuine cuts in order to strengthen economic incentives, towards strong work requirements that are approaching genuine workfare, and towards very strong requirements for young people to take an education. These measures apply to all residents regardless of citizenship. But many elements were nevertheless contained in a package on integration, and in practice, they will mainly apply to refugees and immigrants.

**Administrative reform and private providers**

A last element is administrative reform which could be quite far-reaching. The 2002 agreement about *More People to Work* obliged the authorities responsible for ALMP to allow private providers of activation and other activities access to compete for projects. (Bredgaard & Larsen 2006). This has proceeded quite far but not as far as in pioneering countries like the Nederlands and Australia, and the level seems to have stabilized in 2004 (Arbejdsmarkedsstyrelsen, 2004). The public employment agency has maintained responsibility for almost 2/3 of all insured unemployed. Another important aspect is that the labour movement itself is a key actor (if not the key actor) among the private providers (Bredgaard & Larsen 2006). As to effects, not very much is known, but it seems that those unemployed who have participated in privately provided projects have been quite satisfied. Expectations that private actors would be able to benefit from better contacts with employers have not been met, however. By and large, private actors have not been innovative in introducing new methods to get unemployed to work (Bredgaard & Larsen 2006).

Another major change was the municipal reform which came into force from Jan. 1, 2007. The reform introduced a one-string system with Job Centres, bringing the job offices for recipients of unemployment benefits and municipal authorities for social assistance recipients together in one organization. So far, the two administrations in the job centres remain separate except in 14 municipalities experimenting with a joint administration. The official argument (perhaps less plausible in a full employment situation) is that people receiving unemployment benefits and social assistance often have similar problems and should be treated alike. But needless to say, the government has also been under suspicion for intending to use the administrative reform as a device for reducing trade union influence. As long as the regional ALMP was guided by corporatist boards, the interests of the trade unions were unlikely to be neglected. In principle, one could imagine that a change of
administrative structure could lead to an entirely different outcome without changing the formal rules. It remains to be seen, however, whether the unions and employers associations manage to obtain (formal or informal) influence at the municipal level equivalent to what they used to have at the regional level.

Outcomes
Apart from a strengthened emphasis on incentives, in particular for immigrants, most of the ALMP changes 2001-2007 were in continuation of the changes that took place during the last years of the Social Democratic coalition governments. However, partly due to political signals and institutional changes, and probably even more due to the improved employment situation, there seems to have been more significant changes in outcomes since 2001. A thorough examination of the municipal administration of social assistance in 2006 (Stigaard et al., 2006) revealed that lenient administration of the rules had certainly come to an end. In particular, the emphasis on work seems to be followed quite strictly, even though it runs counter to the professional values of many social workers. We only have anecdotic evidence about the situation at the job offices, but few would question that the rules are administered much more strictly than previously. It may be interpreted as an instance of conversion (Streeck & Thelen, 2005) where institutions are redirected to (partly) new goals, but undoubtedly, the employment situation by itself is quite decisive. At any rate, one could easily exaggerate the importance of the changes in the formal rules in the 1990’s; since 2001, however, the gap between formal rules and practical administration seems to have been closed.

Late 2000’s: policy change at a crossroads?
It would be tempting to imagine a continuation of changes towards strengthening incentives by means of further cutbacks, further tightening of conditionality, and increasing divisions between residents and immigrants. However, there are at least three indications that this is most likely not the case.

The first indication is the 2006 welfare reform. The main element in the reform was an indexation of retirement age from 2019, but it also contained a large number of changes in labour market policy. However, the scope of these changes was quite limited. As to conditionality, the main elements included:
- removal of special arrangements for older unemployed
- mandatory job seeking at the internet each week
- right and duty to activation after 9 months (previously 12 months)
- almost 100 per cent activation after 2½ years of unemployment
- assessment of availability for a job each third month
- a larger role for unemployment insurance funds

Most changes were marginal adjustments, and there were virtually no new initiatives aimed at strengthening incentives. Of course, this is partly to be explained by the broad political compromise over the reform. But a more straightforward explanation is that further reforms are difficult as rules have been tightened about as much as possible. In short, it seems that the path towards successive tightening of conditionality and strengthening of incentives is about to be exhausted.

The second indication is government discourse. In principle, it would be possible to cut unemployment benefits and shorten duration. Business interests and many economists have often proposed to shorten duration from four to 2½ years. However, the government has explicitly endorsed the idea of “flexicurity” in speeches and pamphlets (e.g. Ministry of Labour, 2005a), including relatively generous unemployment benefits and long duration. Some might see this as a way of paying lip service to a concept that is often invoked as an explanation of Denmark’s current economic success. However, just as the discourse of structural unemployment had impact even on the labour movement in the 1990’s, one should not underestimate the importance of the "flexicurity discourse". In the first place, it fits the strategic interests of government leadership in maintaining support from working class voters. And secondly, it has come to serve as a common frame of reference for decision makers.

Finally, just like negative evaluations impacted on activation practices around 2000, negative evaluations seem to impact on the future of ALMP in the late 2000s. The effects of the work requirements for social assistance recipients remain to be seen (for preliminary evaluations, see Christensen, 2007 and Ankestyrelsen, 2007). However, most studies indicate that effects of even strong incentives are rather small (Rosholm, 2006; Clement & Goul Andersen, 2006). There is much dispute about the effects of the start assistance. The government maintained that it does have an effect on employment; Hansen & Hansen (2004) and Blauenfeldt et al. (2006) strongly argued that this was not the case. The issue seems partly to have been settled in a report concluding that employment rates increase from some 10 per cent to some 15 per cent (Huynh et al., 2007). Also in an evaluation of the 2002 and 2005 reforms, a report by the Ministry of Employment (2006) con-
included that these reform had not been very efficient, and the Minister of Employment admitted that even though the current measures would be maintained, the government would have to focus more on barriers in the future (Berlingske Tidende, 31. October, 2006).

Thus it could seem that ALMP is at a crossroads. As long as the Liberal-Conservative government remains in office, reforms already adopted are unlikely to be reversed. But it does seem that the development towards ever more strict criteria of conditionality and towards stronger incentives has come to an end. This indicates that pragmatic policy learning does seem to have an effect, but there are currently few elaborated guidelines for possible future directions of policy.

**Conclusions**

It is sometimes hard to believe that there is only 15 years between the Danish labour market policy in the second half of the 2000’s and the policies of the early 1990’s which came close to a citizens’ wage regime with almost unlimited duration of benefits and little emphasis on the duty to work (Goul Andersen, 1996). From a one-sided emphasis on social rights of the unemployed, all priorities have been directed towards bringing people to work. Even if policies cannot be described as pure workfare (as many other elements remain), they have moved strongly in this direction. At the level of discourse, this started already in the late 1980’s, The 1990’s witnessed a series of policy changes which formally made the Danish unemployment regime one of the most tight in Europe. And since 2001, this has been supplemented by strengthening incentives. However, the most important effect is undoubtedly at the level of outcomes where the formal requirements seem to be used in practice in full scale.

Still, it must be underlined that the uses of economic incentives are highly selective, and that 4 years of duration and up to 90 per cent of replacement for the lowest paid workers has been maintained. The discourse of flexicurity, alongside tactical political interests, makes it unlikely that this will change overnight. It is also worth noticing that the relative distribution of registered unemployed between people receiving unemployment benefits and social assistance has remained the same or even tipped in favour of unemployment benefits. Thus the result is an extremely work oriented regime with tight controls but with maintenance of most of the elements of generous protection. The balance has tipped between activation measures aimed to support those unemployed and workfare measures exerting strong pressures on people to take any job.
In relation to previous discussions about the “stickiness” of the welfare state, the amount of changes over the last 15 years is impressive, even though the basic security elements have not been sacrificed. Among the explanatory factors we certainly find political interests: The Social Democrats managed to adopt the new supply side paradigm of the labour market without following the policy recommendations usually associated with this perspective. Rather, it found alternative policy solutions that were also consistent with the paradigm; the coupling between paradigms and solutions turned out to be less deterministic than sometimes assumed. Also the turn towards actual implementation of tough controls and uses of incentives under the Liberal-Conservative government is explicable in terms of political interests.

However, simple learning effects also seem to play a role. The Social Democrats changed course, first by terminating new leave programmes, and later by changing emphasis in the activation effort. Even the very beginning of the active line was affected by seemingly positive effects of some minor programmes among the young. It also seems that negative evaluations of the most recent programmes had an effect by preventing further moves along these paths. Paradigms and elite discourse also play an important role. The switch to a supply side paradigm had no immediate impacts, but served to shape policies in the longer run. And the elite discourse on flexicurity had, once it was adopted, an effect of its own.

Still, the improved employment situation is probably the single most important determinant of the changes that have taken place. In contrast to the assumption that welfare state change (retrenchment) is determined by austerity, it seems that in the field of labour market policy, prosperity is much more important. The need for more labour power is a major concern, and the possibility to legitimate tighter rules in a situation where jobs are available is obvious. This also implies that, other things being equal, we could expect a certain reversal if the economic situation should suddenly change.
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Project conducted jointly by Centre for Comparative Welfare Studies (CCWS, headed by Jørgen Goul Andersen) and Socialforskningsinstituttet (The Danish National Centre for Social Research, headed by Niels Ploug). Financed by a grant from the Danish Social Science Research Council. The overriding purpose of the project is to contribute to comparative welfare state theory by exploiting the Danish experience comparatively, and to write an encompassing, theoretically oriented book about the Danish welfare state.

The project is composed of 14 interconnected projects:
1. The Danish welfare state (book project)
2. New perspectives on welfare state theory (book project)
3. Conceptualisation of welfare and change: The dependent variable problem
4. Testing equivalence by fuzzy-set theory
5. Interests, ideas, institutions: The independent variable problem
7. Social policy competition and mobility: EU and the welfare state
8. Intergenerational risk and social policy
10. Ageing and the pension system
11. Older workers and firms
12. Public and private provision of social welfare (supportive project)
13. Voter constraints and dynamics
14. Immigration and the legitimacy of the welfare state (supportive project)

The project is described at the home page:

Contributions to books and journals and publications in press


Working Papers


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standardisation of the life course: The case of Denmark. Paper Presented at inter-
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